MM Lee reflected on Singapore population challenge, which is how to coax Singaporeans to have more kids, during NUSS dialogue 20 March 2009. I would like to offer a possible explanation, based on Game Theory, to Singapore population’s dilemma. Please refer to below diagram:
Game Theory on Singapore Population
The numbers indicate the descending order of desirability (1 is most desirable).
I use the following assumptions:
- Singapore government spend more to draft new policy to induce Singaporeans to get married and have at least 2 kids, while the government will spend less if they bring in foreigners and offer citizenship to quality foreigners.
- Singaporeans need to sacrifice more resources (time, money, and effort), i.e. spend more, to have family with at least 2 kids, while they can have more freedom, i.e. spend less, if they stay single or just have 1 child. (Note: stay single in the above table include couple with 1 child).
Singapore government most desirable outcome is when they bring in foreigners for Singapore economic stability and Singaporeans have at least 2 kids. The least desirable would be when the government come up with new incentives to stimulate population growth, but Singaporeans stay single. Between the remaining two options, Singapore government prefers to spend more to ensure Singaporeans as the majority of the population (and therefore avoid situation that MM lee described: Singaporeans would become the last of Mohicans), than the other option which could reduce the ratio of Singaporeans to foreigners.
On the other hand, Singaporeans prefer to stay single and the government to offer them more incentives to get married because Singaporeans will have more flexibility and choices available (after all we are ‘kiasu’ singaporeans). So this is the most desirable from Singaporeans perspective. The least desirable option is when the government bring in foreigners and they have family with at least 2 kids, Singaporeans will feel insecure about their jobs and concern about the increased competition with foreigners. Between the remaining two options, Singaporeans prefer to bite government incentives and raise family with at least 2 kids, rather than stay single and compete with foreigners.
The game theoretic table above tells us that the dominant strategy for Singapore government is to spend less (and therefore bring in more foreigners), while the dominant strategy for Singaporeans is also to spend less (stay single). When we combine the two dominant strategy (in game theory, the intersection between the two dominant strategy will be the equilibrium of the game), we have Singapore government bring in more foreigners and Singaporeans stay single (3, 3). This explains the Singapore population’s dilemma: the government have no choice but to bring in more foreigners to boost up population, while Singaporeans embrace single-hood as a new lifestyle.
In Game Theory, this situation is called the prisoner’s dilemma, i.e. the combined dominant strategies lead to an outcome that is far from ideal. Only if Singapore government and Singaporeans each chooses non-dominant strategy, then both parties will be able to reach optimum (2,2).
1 Comment
April 1, 2009 at 9:50 pm
This makes a lot of sense for a city state such as Singapore. I wonder if Luxembourg, etc. has a similar problem?
A second way to raise the birth rate, or course, is to increase the relative amount of income and employment opportunities for males while decreasing them for females.